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NOTE
TRADING STAMPS: A CHALLENGE TO REGULATION
OF PRICE COMPETITION
Assailed by some as "a costly device that raises family food bills" 1 and
hotly defended by others as "a perfectly legal promotional tool," 2 trading
stamps have become a center of controversy in the merchandising field.
Though stamp plans have enjoyed a rapid upsurge in growth since World
War II, the idea itself is over fifty-years old.8 Today the trading stamp
business is estimated to gross over one-half billion dollars annually.4
A typical stamp plan has as its foundation a contract between a stamp
company and a retailer whereby, for an agreed sum, the company is to
furnish retailer with stamps, stamp saving books and catalogues illus-
trating the merchandise for which the stamps may be redeemed.5 Retailer
distributes the stamps to his customers, usually at the rate of one for
each ten-cents worth of merchandise purchased by them. The customer
collects the stamps in his book until he has the number required to ex-
change for the article he desires. The stamps are then redeemable at
centers established by the company for this purpose. Usually the stamps
may be redeemed only in lots of a book or more. A book of the Sperry &
Hutchinson Company, the largest of the stamp companies, has room for
twelve hundred stamps representing one hundred twenty dollars worth
of purchases by the customer. One full book of stamps may be redeemed
for merchandise having an approximate retail value of three dollars, 2.5%
of the value of the purchases made. Many variations are made upon this
basic scheme. For example, some merchants have "double stamp days"
on which they issue twice the usual number of stamps. Others, to secure
the stamp company profit, establish their own plans and redeem the stamps
themselves. Stamp plans in Wisconsin must, by statute," provide for re-
demption in cash rather than in merchandise.
1. See Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1956, p. 1, col. 6.
2. Ibid.
3. The Sperry & Hutchinson Company, the oldest of the trading stamp companies
presently operating, and also the largest, was founded in 1900. Comment, 24 TENN. L.
REV. 557, 558 (1956).
4. VRFDENDuRG, TRADING STAMPS (Indiana Bus. Rep. No. 21, 1955); Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Oct. 21, 1956, p. 15, col. 1.
5. Brief for the Sperry & Hutchinson Co. as Intervenor, p. 4, Colgate-Palmolive
Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956). Descriptions of
trading stamp plans may also be found in VEDENBURG, op. cit. .mpra note 2; Comment,
24 TENN. L. REv. 557, 558 (1956).
6. Wis. SrAT. § 100.15(1) (1953).
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No one doubts that the stamp companies are benefiting from the up-
surge of interest in these plans. The economic question is whether the re-
tailer and the consumer gain as well. Proponents of the trading stamp
claim that its use results in an increased volume of business for the retailer,
better distribution of his sales over the week, increased stability of clientele
and more high mark-up business. As a result the retailer is supposed to
enjoy lower unit costs and rising profits, easily sufficient to cover the cost
of the stamps. The consumer for his part is able to obtain a wide
variety of valuable merchandise such as toasters, silverware, furni-
ture, blankets and the like, all without having to make a cash outlay, and
which he might not otherwise have acquired. Since a demand is thereby
created for this merchandise, manufacturers of such goods and the national
economy benefit as well. Those skeptical of the stamp reject these claims.
They argue that although the first retailer to use trading stamps in an
area may enjoy a temporary increase in sales volume, his competitors soon
adopt the practice in self defense with the net effect that all must con-
tinue to use the stamps just to retain the volumes they previously had.
The stamp then becomes simply another item of cost that must either be
absorbed by the retailer, shrinking his profits, or be passed on to the con-
sumer through higher prices. The consumer does get something for
his money, but it may be merchandise that is neither needed nor wanted.
Furthermore, he may, in effect, be paying more for it through stamps than
he would have to if he purchased it outright. These economic argu-
ments have been evaluated elsewhere so far as current data permits. 7 Prob-
ably in large measure because of the economic controversy the trading
stamp has given rise to considerable legislation and litigation.8
Some of the legislation dealing with trading stamps has been designed
to preclude their use, either directly 9 or through prohibitory taxes.' 0 Many
such statutes have been declared invalid under state constitutions," though
7. For an economic analysis of the use of trading stamps, see VmRDxNBuRG, op. cit.
supra note 2; Comment, 24 TENN. L. Rzv. 557, 559-66 (1956); Forum on Trading
Stamps, N.Y. Retailer, Nov. 1956; Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1956, p. 1, col.
6. It is the editors' understanding that an extensive study of the trading stamp is to
be conducted at Columbia University.
8. See pp. 244-60 infra. The trading stamp is also the subject of a current investiga-
tion by the Federal Trade Commission, the results of which will be reviewed by the
Senate Committee on Small Business. Letter from Senator John Sparkman, Chairman
of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, to the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Aug. 31, 1956, on file in Biddle Law Library; letter from Harry A. Bab-
cock, Director, Bureau of Investigation, Federal Trade Commission, to the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Aug. 28, 1956, on file in Biddle Law Library.
9. E.g., S.C. CODE § 66-2 (1952). It is the author's understanding, however, that
this statute has been held unconstitutional by a South Carolina trial court in an unre-
ported and non-appealed decision and that stamps are being issued throughout the
state. Pendergrass v. Dixie Home Food Stores, Inc., Florence County, S.C. Civ. Ct.,
Sept. 25, 1954. 4
10. E.g., Acts of Ala. 1956, Nos. 110, 148 (applicable only to redemption stores);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 890 (1955) ($100 per county per company).
11. E.g., Ex parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 82 Pac. 429 (1905) ; Lawton v. Stewart
Dry Goods Co., 197 Ky. 394, 247 S.W. 14 (1923); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Mc-
Bride, 307 Mass. 408, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940) ; State v. Lothrops-Farnham Co., 84 N.H.
322, 150 Atl. 551 (1930). Contra, State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (1917) ;
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the Supreme Court has held that they do not conflict with the United
States Constitution. 12  Other enactments have attempted only to regulate
use of the stamps. Illustrative is a Wisconsin act requiring that stamps
be redeemable only in cash rather than merchandise, and that the cash
value of each stamp be printed on its face.13 Also, statutes have been pro-
posed in several states to bring stamp company reserves for unredeemed
stamps within the escheatment laws.' 4 Indicative of the growing legislative
interest in the use of trading stamps is the fact that within a recent twelve-
month period fifty bills dealing with trading stamps were introduced into
legislatures in twenty-four states.15
Much of the litigation concerning trading stamps has, of course, in-
volved the above-mentioned legislation. However, a great deal of it has
been concerned with the relation of trading stamps to fair trade and sales-
below-cost statutes. It is this problem that will be considered herein.
TRADING STAMPS UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION
Fair trade laws, enacted in forty-five states,' 6 Hawaii and Puerto
Rico, give an action for damages to one who is injured by another's "wil-
fully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions [of the statute]. .. . .", Only trade-marked or branded
goods "in free and open competition with commodities of the same general
class produced or distributed by others" may be made the subject of a fair
trade contract.' 8 The contract, which establishes the minimum resale
price, may be entered into between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or
retailer, or in some instances between a wholesaler and retailer, but not
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Weigle, 169 Wis. 562, 173 N.W. 315 (1919). Other cases
dealing with the constitutionality of legislation either prohibiting or regulating trading
stamps may be found in Annots., 133 A.L.R. 1087 (1941); 124 A.L.R. 341 (1940);
26 A.L.R. 707 (1923); 1917A L.R.A. 421; 49 L.R.A. 1123 (1914); 30 L.R.A. 957
(1911) ; 7 L.R.A. 1131 (1907) ; 2 L.R.A. 588 (1906). An analysis of the problems
involved appears in Wolff, Sales Promotio= by Premiums as a Competitive Practice, 40
COLUtm. L. REv. 1175 (1940). See also Note, 41 IowA L. REv. 265 (1956).
12. Rast v. VanDeman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1915); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S.
369 (1915) ; Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1915).
13. Wis. STAT. § 100.15(1) (1953). An attempt in Oregon to declare the trading
stamp a "security" within the meaning of the state blue sky law failed. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. Hudson, 190 Ore. 458, 226 P2d 501 (1951).
14. Reported in Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1956, p. 1, col. 6.
15. Ibid.
16. Missouri, Texas and Vermont are the only states that have not enacted such
laws. A complete compilation of fair trade laws may be found in 2 CCH TRADP RIio.
Rzw. f111 0000-5585 (1956).
17. All fair trade laws follow closely the wording of either the California Fair
Trade Act, the first in the field, or the Model Fair Trade Statute of the National
Association of Retail Druggists. The California act and the Model Statute are
similar in most respects, though the latter contains a number of provisions not found
in the former. The provision cited in text is common to both. See, e.g., MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 93, § 14B (1954).
18. E.g., ARM STAT. ANN. § 70-202 (1947); Colo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-1
(1953). This wording is common to all acts patterned after the Model Statute of the
National Association of Retail Druggists. The California act and those patterned after
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between parties at the same level in the distributive process. 19 The acts
provide that as soon as one such contract governing resale of a particular
item is concluded within the state, all other distributors of the same level
in the state who receive notice of the contract are bound by it, that is,
may not sell that item at less than the price established by the contract
even though they are non-signers.2 0 In addition, fair trade acts of twenty
states and territories 2' include an "anti-concession" clause making it a
violation to offer or make "any concession of any kind whatsoever whether
by the giving of coupons or otherwise in connection with any such sale." 22
The constitutionality of fair trade laws has been upheld by the Supreme
Court,s3 and Congress has seen fit to exempt such acts,2 4 including the
non-signer provisions,s from the antitrust laws. Recently, however,
all or some part-usually the non-signer provision-of a number of fair trade
statutes have been held to violate state constitutions. 6
The "Anti-Concession" Clause
The use of trading stamps has posed at least two significant problems
under the fair trade laws. The first is the applicability .of the "anti-con-
cession clause" to the distribution of trading stamps with the sale of fair-
traded merchandise. Does such distribution constitute "any concession
of any kind whatsoever whether by the giving of coupons or otherwise
it read "fair and open competition." E.g., CAL. Bus. & PRor. Coos ANN. § 16902
(West 1954); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 93, § 14A (1954). (Emphasis added.) Apparently
the difference in phrasing has no practical effect. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158
F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947).
19. Common to all fair trade laws.
20. Common to all fair trade laws. This provision has been declared unconsti-
tutional by a number of state courts. See note 26 infra.
21. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.
22. E.g., Aax. STAT. ANN. § 70-203 (1947) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 325.09 (1947).
23. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936).
24. Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
25. McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
26. Arkansas, Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc.,
224 Ark 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Colorado, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v.
Francis, 301 P.2d 139 (1956) ; Florida, Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d
680 (1954) ; Sterling Drug Co. v. Eckerd's, Inc., 71 So. 2d 156 (1954); Georgia, Cox
v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); Grayson-Robinson Stores,
Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E2d 161 (1953) ; Indina, Bargain Barn, Inc. v.
Arvin Industries, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 1168074 (Super. Ct.)QK-entucky, General
Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Cooperative, Inc., CCH TRADE Rm. REP. (1956 Trade
Cas.) 11 68341 (Cir. Ct. May 2, 1956); Michigan, Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool
Shop Sporting Goods Co, 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); Nebraska, General
Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 159 Neb. 736, 68 N.W.2d 620 (1955); McGraw
Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W2d 608 (1955) ; Oregon,
General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, CCH TRADn Rxo. Rm. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1168333 (April
18, 1956); South Carolina, Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1955
Trade Cas. ff 68084 (Richland County Ct.) ; Utah, General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales,
Inc., CCH TRADn R4G. RziP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1168482 (Sept. 22, 1956). The Virginia
Fair Trade Law was held inoperative as conflicting with subsequent antitrust legisla-
tion. Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956).
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in connection with any such sale" ? In Lambert Pharmical Co. v. Roberts
Bros.27 the court answered affirmatively, holding that a state statute which
forbids various means used to evade fair-trade contracts, and which lists
coupons as one of these means, makes it clear that trading stamps are to
be considered violative of such contracts.28 This decision seems sound, it
being not unreasonable to conclude that "coupon" includes trading stamps.
The Wisconsin legislature has precluded any doubt by mentioning trading
stamps specifically. 29 However, an issue that may remain is whether
only the giving of coupons with sales at minimum prices is a violation, or
whether the clause forbids giving coupons with any sale of a fair-traded
article. Viewing the "anti-concession" provision in the context of the
whole statute, the former interpretation seems more appropriate. If fair
trading be a constitutional means of protecting the manufacturer's good will
by prohibiting price cutting, 0 then no constitutional problem is raised by
a provision which adds that a sale at minimum price accompanied by the
giving of a "coupon" results in a violation. But a provision interpreted to
prohibit all concessions regardless of the price charged would raise consti-
tutional problems, since the prohibited conduct would bear no relation to
the lawful object of the statute, viz., preventing impairment of the manu-
facturer's good will through resale price cutting below the minimum estab-
lished by the manufacturer.3 '
Trading Stamps: "Cost of Selling" or "Reduction in Price"?
The second and more difficult problem is whether dispensing trading
stamps to purchasers of fair-traded articles who have paid minimum prices
results in a sale "at less than the price stipulated." The issue may be pre-
sented in one of two situations. In the first the manufacturer or a retailer
brings suit against a user of the stamps claiming that their use results in a
sale below the minimum price.8 2  In the second situation the manufacturer
27. 1950 Trade Cas. 11 62669 (Ore. Cir. Ct.).
28. Accord, Mennen Co. v. Katz, 1950 Trade Cas. 62734 (Litchfield County,
Conn. C.P.). A similar issue arises under the sales-below-cost legislation. See pp.
256-57 infra.
29. Wis. STAT. § 100.15(2) (1953). As will appear, see pp. 253-54 infra, fair trade
laws must be regarded as exceptions to the antitrust laws, authorized as such by the
Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), and the McGuire
Act, 66 STAT. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1952). The judicial history of the fair
trade laws indicates that they are to be limited to the extent of the exemption granted
in the federal enabling legislation, which in turn will be strictly construed. Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) ; United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). The argument that extension of fair trade laws
to ban trading stamps may not be within the granted exception to the antitrust laws,
see pp. 253-54 infra, applies with equal force in the case of "anti-concession" clauses.
30. See pp. 251-53 infra.
31. See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936); pp. 251-53 i nfra.
32. Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684,
131 P.2d 856 (1942); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E2d 177 (1950);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939); Palmer v.
Angert, 275 App. Div. 965, 90 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2d Dep't), reversing 145 Misc. 36, 86
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brings suit against an obvious price-cutter, who asserts in defense; that the
manufacturer may not complain because he is permitting others to violate
resale contracts by giving the stamps to purchasersPas When the stamp
issue arises in the latter fashion, it will be decided between two parties
neither of whom have a direct interest in the stamps3 4 For this reason, and
since there is a very real question whether furnishing stamps does violate the
act, it would seem-at least in jurisdictions where the issue has not
previously been resolved-that when a manufacturer seeks to enjoin
a manifest and flagrant violation of the act a court should be especially
hesitant to hold him barred on this ground by "unclean hands."
The predominant view is that issuance of trading stamps with pur-
chases of fair-traded articles at minimum prices is not a violation of the
fair trade laws. Courts so holding have concluded that the stamps repre-
sent a discount for the payment of cash and that such a discount is not a
reduction in price; 3 5 or that they are merely a trade promotional device
similar to advertising or the extension of credit and that the act is not in-
tended to ban such devices; 36 or that the stamps, even if a violation, come
within the maxim de minimis non curat leX.3 7 However, some cases reach
the opposite result on the ground that, because the stamps may be redeemed
for merchandise, they have value in themselves and, accordingly, constitute
a reduction to that extent in the price of the article purchased.3 8  One recent
decision suggested that the stamps may represent a quantity discount which,
as opposed to a cash discount, is normally considered a reduction in price.39
N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct 1949); Benjamin v. Palan Drug Co., 144 Misc. 879, 88
N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct 1948), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1036, 92 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1st Dep't
1949); Nechamkin v. Picker, 67 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Gever v. American
Stores Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1168404 (Philadelphia County
C.P. June 7, 1956).
33. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956); Union Carbide and Carbon Corp v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas.
1 70849 (Ohio C.P.). In the situation posed the manufacturer will normally be seeking
an injunction. It is generally held to be a defense to a fair trade action brought by a
manufacturer to show that the manufacturer has not been reasonably diligent in en-
forcing his fair-trade contracts. This defense is not set forth in the act but appears
to be a development from the requirement imposed by courts of equity that a com-
plainant seeking an equitable remedy must have "clean hands."
34. In Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956), the Sperry & Hutchinson Company was permitted to intervene.
35. Weco Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684,
131 P.2d 856 (1942); Benjamin v. Palan Drug Co., 144 Misc. 879, 88 N.Y.S2d 291
(Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1036, 92 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1st Dep't 1949);
Nechamkin v. Picker, 67 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct 1946).
36. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939); Gever v.
American Stores Co., CCH TRADx RAG. Rx'. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68404 (Philadelphia
County C.P. June 7, 1956).
37. "The law is not concerned with trifles." Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros. Inc., supra
note 36.
38. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950); Palmer v.
Angert, 275 App. Div. 965, 90 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2d Dep't), reversing 145 Misc. 36, 86
N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
39. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 545, 549
(D. Mass. 1956). The issue arose by way of a defense. See note 33 supra. In a sup-
plementary opinion the court noted that plaintiff had filed a separate suit in the Massa-
chusetts courts to enjoin certain of its retail outlets from giving stamps with sales of
1956]
248 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
To hold that distribution of trading stamps is not a violation because
the stamps represent a "cash discount" which, according to accounting
procedure,4° is a cost of selling rather than a reduction in price, subordinates
the legal question to the accounting conclusion. Even assuming that stamp
distribution is properly analogous to a cash discount,41 its treatment as a
selling cost is sound only to the extent that the factors dictating such an
accounting conclusion are proper ones for consideration in resolving the
legal issue. But the accounting conclusion is an arbitrary one. It is de-
signed primarily to achieve consistency with the same enterprise's account-
ing treatment of similarly ambiguous transactions, 42 a factor obviously
bearing no relation to the legal issue involved. While in the case of stamps a
stronger argument may be made for treatment as a selling cost, since seller
receives in cash the full list price regardless of the discount in stamps and
must therefore account for the cash income as well as for his payment to
the stamp company for use of the stamps, the accounting conclusion remains
arbitrary nonetheless, because it measures the effect of the transaction from
the standpoint of seller alone. How the seller reflects a cash discount on his
books is of no consequence to buyer; from buyer's viewpoint, when he re-
ceives two-cents worth of trading stamps 4 with the purchase of an item
plaintiff's products at the minimum fair-trade price. Since this met the objection of
defendant and since the court was unwilling to rule that plaintiff was barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands, an injunction was issued against defendant. Id. at 550. In
a second supplemental opinion the court ruled that since the plaintiff had by bringing
suit against the offending retailers abandoned its position that issuance of stamps did
not violate fair-trade contracts, the question as to whether the practice was a violation
so far as this action was concerned was now moot. Ibid. It would seem, however,
that since the court in its original opinion in effect made it a prerequisite to an injunc-
tion that plaintiff bring suit against the stamp givers, a ruling was made on the stamp
issue.
40. All accountants do not treat a cash discount as a selling cost; some may
consider it in effect a reduction in selling price. Assuming the discount to be in specie
rather than in stamps, the reason for this can easily be demonstrated: When seller's
list price is one dollar, and he allows a two per cent discount for the payment of cash,
only ninety-eight cents need change hands; seller can therefore show the sale on his
books at the latter figure or, on the other hand, he can carry the sale at one dollar and
show an offset of two cents under expenses.
41. In the cases, sellers and stamp companies consistently maintain that the stamps
are in fact a discount for the payment of cash. They argue that cash discounts are
legitimate and only through the stamps can such a discount conveniently be given on
small sales. But the manner in which stamp plans often operate lends support to the
contention that if the stamps be a discount for the payment of cash it is in name only,
for in substance the stamps are simply another gimmick to promote sales. Some stamp
users, for example, give stamps with purchases made on credit. See Bristol-Myers Co.
v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A2d 843 (1939) (cash discount argument disregarded,
apparently because defendant gave stamps with purchases made on credit). Others
have "double stamp days" or give stamps only to those who request them. See
authorities cited in note 5 supra.
42. E.g., a cash discount on purchases can be considered a reduction in the purchase
price of merchandise or as miscellaneous income attributable to the advantageous use of
an enterprise's capital. Accordingly, some accountants argue that because cash dis-
counts on purchases and sales are similar in form, their classification in an income
statement should be similar. FINNY & MmLE, PRINCIPLES ov AccouNTIG--INT4R-
mrIATn 82-84 (4th ed. 1951).
43. The value of the stamps to the buyer is not necessarily their cost to the
seller. Thus, the buyer may receive stamps redeemable for two-cents worth of
merchandise but which cost the seller three cents to acquire from the stamp company.
On seller's books the "cash discount" would be the latter figure.
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fair-traded at one dollar, his net purchase price may justifiably be consid-
ered -ninety-eight cents. Thus, labeling the stamps a "cash discount"
settles nothing, for even if sellers will normally treat the stamps as a selling
cost such treatment represents no more than seller's bookkeeping proce-
dure.
The position that stamp issuance is a promotional device not unlike
advertising, free delivery or credit extension and, therefore, does not violate
fair trade, premises that if these other devices are not violations then neither
are trading stamps. The stamps are clearly aimed at promoting sales, but
it does not follow that the fair-trade status of other promotional devices
governs that of trading stamps as well. For example, loss leader selling,
also a promotional device, is patently inconsistent with fair trading. In
Sunbeam Corp. v. Klein 44 defendant contended that his price cut below the
fair-trade minimum was justified because his competitors, while selling
at the minimum price, extended credit costing them the equivalent of de-
fendant's price cut. The court rejected this defense, thereby also rejecting
the view that all promotional devices must be treated identically.441 Further-
more, trading stamps and price cuts may be readily differentiated from
advertising and other such devices in terms of their direct relation to each
article sold: the cost of trading stamps per ten-cent sale remains relatively
constant, while unit advertising expense varies with total sales volume.
The de minimis argument is a legalism that would enable courts to
avoid the question altogether. It is true that the value of an individual
stamp is small, but in view of the importance of trading stamps as a com-
petitive device, as evidenced by the presently formidable and potentially
larger volume of business conducted on this basis, the conclusion that the
problem is de minimis appears erroneous.
On the other hand, the argument that the stamps result in a reduction
in price because they may be redeemed for merchandise of value and are
therefore valuable themselves is but the counter to the cash discount argu-
ment. As was indicated, which of the two conclusions seems more sound-
reduction in price or cost of sale-may depend entirely on whether the
transaction is considered from the position of the buyer or the seller.
44. 32 Del. Ch. 65, 79 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1951).
44a. Assuming that trading stamps represent a cash discount, an argument similar
to that made by the defendant to justify his price cut may be made for not includ-
ing the stamps within the ban of the fair trade laws. Since the cost to the merchant of
a cash discount and extension of credit are directly related to the price of the articles
sold, it may be contended that they should be treated alike. But it would appear
inconsistent to require a merchant who gives trading stamps to increase his sale price
by the value of the stamps to avoid a fair trade violation while not requiring a
merchant who extends credit to do likewise. Assuming that the legislature did not
intend to include the extension of credit within the ban of the act, this inequity may
be avoided by holding the cash discount not within the ban of the act as well. The
difficulty with this argument is, however, that the legislature may have intended to
so discriminate upon the ground that the cash discount results in a "visible" return to
the customer, while the benefit to the customer from the extension of credit is
"invisible." Ultimately, then, the problem is one of determining what the legislature
did in fact intend. See pp. 251-53 infra.
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A second theory on which the stamps are said to violate the act is
that their distribution constitutes a retroactive quantity discount, with the
result that the sales are below minimum prices. This view postulates that
quantity discounts are generally recognized as price reductions. It is then
urged that, because the customer cannot redeem the stamps until enough
are accumulated to fill at least one book, he is rewarded only for large or
numerous purchases; hence, the stamps are a form of quantity discount.
It must be conceded that the stamp transaction resembles a quantity dis-
count to the extent that it rewards the purchaser, and that seller will
normally treat a "quantity discount" as a reduction in selling price. How-
ever, in the case of trading stamps the "quantity discount" denotation ap-
pears inappropriate and, regardless of the accounting label, it is unlikely
that seller would treat the transaction as a price reduction.
That the stamp transaction should be considered a quantity discount
is doubtful. First, the stamps are given with all purchases, not only with
purchases of a particular article, whereas the technical term "quantity dis-
count" is generally restricted to transactions involving large purchases of
one article on which price reductions are made possible by the unit economies
resulting from larger scale handling and purchasing.45 Although lower
unit costs may result from an increase in aggregate sales volume achieved
through the use of trading stamps, such economies are not directly
attributable to the sales of any given article with which the stamps are
distributed. Secondly, a buyer may purchase a single fair-traded item in
one store and add to the stamps received from this purchase those acquired
at other stores, thus placing the seller of the fair-traded item in the curious
position of giving a "quantity discount" on other merchants' sales. Char-
acterization of the trading stamp transaction as a "quantity discount," there-
fore, appears a distortion of the term's normal meaning. Assuming, never-
theless, that seller labels the stamp transaction a "quantity discount," he
must still account for the full amount of the list price and the cost of the
stamps to him. In doing so, he cannot record the stamp cost as a reduc-
tion in selling price if his books are to portray the entire transaction; he
must credit his income for the full cash price received and treat the stamps
separately as a selling cost.
Thus, the result again depends on whether the transaction is viewed
from the buyer's or seller's position, and again the choice involves but a de-
termination of the original issue: do trading stamps violate fair trade? Doc-
trinal formulas cannot resolve this issue; even if buyer and seller were
to view the transaction identically for their respective accounting purposes,
the legal conclusion of violation vel non does not necessarily follow, for the
accounting labels are based on considerations immaterial to the merits of
the legal issue. In attending primarily to the foregoing arguments, the
courts have examined only indirectly the purpose of fair trade legislation
45. For a discussion of quantity discounts and their relation to price, see BALDXR-
STON, BP=CHT, KARABASZ & R1DDL, MANAGXMXNT OP AN ENTXRPRSP, 317-19 (2d ed.
1949).
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and the implications of holding stamp transactions within or without the
scope of these statutes.46 Any decision which fails to focus directly on these
considerations serves only to increase the confusion that surrounds trading
stamps and fair trade itself.
47
The Purpose of Fair Trade
Resale price maintenance did not originate with the advent of fair
trade.4 8 Fair trade acts merely gave legislative approval to conduct which
had theretofore been declared illegal under the Sherman 49 and Federal
Trade Commission Acts.& 0 As indicated by the Federal Trade Commission,
"one of the principal arguments advanced for the legalization of resale
price maintenance was that it was needed to enable manufacturers to
control [loss-leader selling] .... " 81 It was contended that without
such control unrestricted price cutting would devalue branded products
in the public mind and, by making it unprofitable for many retailers and
wholesalers to meet competition, 2 would disrupt the, distributive system
necessary to keep those goods on the market. Hence, fair trade was
justified as a means of protecting both the manufacturer's good will in his
branded products and the public interest in retaining distributive outlets
for such products. Upon these grounds the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of fair trading.P That the fair trade acts have been de-
signed to accomplish this purpose is clear from the form in which they
are drawn. Fair trading is voluntary on the part of the manufacturer, but
once he makes his decision to engage in it his distributors are bound.
The fair-traded article must be branded or trademarked, the sort of article to
which good will would attach.54 In addition, the acts do not permit hori-
zontal agreements which would protect wholesalers and retailers from price
46. In Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950), the court
did focus directly on the question of the purpose of the New York Fair Trade Act.
See note 55 infra.
47. As a result, one can be sympathetic with the feelings of a trading stamp com-
pany when it said that it "grows awfully tired of serving as the whipping boy for the
opposing forces in the current fair-trade battle." Brief for the Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
as Intervenor, p. 1, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
545 (D. Mass. 1956).
48. The history of resale price maintenance prior to the passage of the state fair
trade acts is reported in FTC, REPORT ON RzsAL PRIcE MAINTmNANC4 15-38 (1945);
GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGIsLATioN 14-17 (1939) ; McLaughlin,
Fair Trade Acts, 86 U. Pa. L. Rzv. 803-15 (1938).
49. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) ; Park & Sons
Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
50. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). But cf. United States v.
General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (manufacturer permitted to fix price to
consumer where distributor is agent).
51. FTC, op. cit. supra note 48, at lix.
52. An analysis of the extent to which fair trading serves the interests of
manufacturers and consumers may be found in GRnrHa, op. cit. supra note 48, at 256-
320.
53. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
194-96 (1936).
54. These provisions are common to all fair trade laws.
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competition but which would bear no direct relationship to protection of a
manufacturer's good will.
If the objective of fair trading is only to protect the manufacturer's
good will and the public interest in having branded goods on the market,
then it is arguable that issuance of trading stamps with purchases of fair-
traded articles does not contravene this policy. Because stamps are given
with all types of purchases, and because they are of small value individually,
there would not appear the same direct association in the purchaser's mind
between the stamp transaction and the value of the fair-traded articles
included among his purchases as there is in the case of loss-leader selling
and other forms of straight price cutting which are obviously outlawed.65
Though fair trading was clearly conceived of as a means of protecting
the manufacturer and the public, it may also have been intended to protect
the retailer and the wholesaler from the vicissitudes of price competition. 6
The Federal Trade Commission found that although resale price mainte-
nance was originally advocated by manufacturers, "when finally enacted
by the States, and by the Congress . . . its enactment was urged almost
entirely by a few well-organized dealer groups as a means of eliminating
price competition both of dealers using the same method of distribution and
of dealers using new and different methods of distribution." 5 The first
of the fair trade acts was termed "an act to protect trade-mark owners,
distributors and the public against injurious and uneconomic practices in
the distribution of articles of standard quality under a distinguished trade-
mark, brand or name." 5 8 Another indication that fair trading was to
assist retailers and wholesalers is that during the period of the NRA few
states found it necessary to enact a fair trade law. However, following the
demise of the NRA 5 9 and its system of price regulation through trade
association codes, numerous state legislatures quickly authorized fair
trading.'0 "The NRA . . . prominently influenced the . . . movement
toward price control, for it gave the members of the trades just enough of a
taste of long-forbidden fruits to whet their appetites .... , 61
55. But see Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E2d 177 (1950),
where the court found the purpose of the New York Fair Trade Act to be the pro-
tection of the manufacturer's good will and concluded that there would be a direct
relation in the customer's mind between the trading stamps and the value of the fair-
traded product to the detriment of that good will. This conclusion was reached, how-
ever, only after the court through the application of a doctrinal formula had found
the stamps to be a reduction in price and hence a violation.
56. See Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements
Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607, 615-16 (1940).
57. FTC, op. cit. supra note 48, at liv; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 417 (1948).
58. Preamble to the California Fair Trade Act of 1931, as. cited in GPRE-MR, op. cit.
supra note 48, at 412. (Emphasis added.)
59. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
60. Between 1935 and 1937 forty states enacted fair trade laws. But this rush to
enact fair trade laws may also be attributed to the Supreme Court's removal in 1936 of
the constitutional doubts surrounding fair trading in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v.
Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
61. GazrHPR, op. cit. supra note 48; see Shulman, supra note 56, at 616.
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If it is also the purpose of fair trade laws to protect the wholesaler
and retailer from price competition, and if this is a constitutionally legiti-
mate purpose and a proper means to accomplish it, 8 the courts would have
to decide whether the stamp distribution constitutes price competition.
In this event a different result may, of course, follow. The issue would be
essentially the same as that which develops under sales-below-cost legisla-
tion, to be discussed later herein.6
Trading Stamps and Antitrust Policy
The antitrust implications of holding the stamp transaction violative
of fair trade laws should be considered together with the purpose of such
laws. If to conclude that the stamp transaction is prohibited requires a
prior conclusion that the purpose of the fair trade laws includes assistance
to distributors, then it seems proper to test that prior conclusion by the
likelihood that such an objective was condoned by the legislatures.
Fair trade laws are clearly exceptions to the overriding public antitrust
policy against price fixing. Yet the fair trade laws themselves ban hori-
zontal price fixing, at least by contract.L 4 This provision would be inap-
posite if the legislature intended to protect distributors from price com-
petition. So also would utilization of the antitrust laws to enjoin fair trade
prosecutions by distributor trade associations ' and the more subtle but
more effective means of collective pressure exerted on manufacturers by
such associations attempting to exploit fair trade as a means of assuring
price stability at a profitable level.0 8 If a purpose of fair trade is to protect
distributors, such conduct would be entirely proper. However, as noted by
the Federal Trade Commission,0 7 the Attorney General's Committee 68 and
others, 9 any extension of fair trading reduces the effectiveness of the
antitrust prohibitions against horizontal price fixing. Therefore, it is
insufficient merely to assert that Congress exempted the fair trade laws
from the antitrust statutes,70 for such an assertion leaves undetermined
the extent of the intended exemption. Even if it is found that the purpose
of the state legislatures would be served by including stamp transactions
within the fair-trade edict, if the congressional exemption did not extend
that far 7' the effect of so holding might well contravene national policy
62. See id. at 616-23.
63. See p. 260 in!ra.
64. This provision is common to all fair trade laws.
65. See FTC, op. cit. supra note 48, at lvi.
66. See id. at liv.
67. Id. at lxii.
68. RZF4PORT 01i Tim ArToRNEY Gm~iz's NATIONAL Com=eIm= To STUDY THE
ANTrRUST LAws 149-55 (1955).
69. E.g., Herman, A Note on Pair Trade, 65 YAL. L.J. 23, 24 (1955). But see
Adams, Fair Trade and the Art of Prestidigitation, 65 YAtE L.J. 196 (1955) ; Adams,
Resale Price Maintenance; Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967 (1955).
70. Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952); McGuire Act,
66 STAT. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
71. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2181 (1952).
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as expressed in the antitrust laws, at least to the extent that interstate
commerce is involved.
It would seem, therefore, that although a simple solution to the
problem may not emerge, a more meaningful result will be reached if the
courts focus directly on the purpose of fair trade and the possible implica-
tions of its extension to limit the use of trading stamps. Accordingly, it
is submitted that it is more proper to view fair trade solely as a means of
protecting the manufacturer's good will and the public's interest in having
branded goods on the market, not as a means of protecting the retailer and
wholesaler from price competition. Although these distributors will also
be protected from such forms of price competition as loss-leader merchan-
dising, other competitive practices that do not affect product good will would
not fall under the ban, thereby serving the free competition policy of the
antitrust laws. Since issuance of trading stamps would seem to be among
the latter type of practice, use of the stamps should not be inhibited as a
violation of the fair trade laws.
TRADING STAMPS UNDER SALES-BELOW-COST LEGISLATION
Some form of sales-below-cost legislation has been enacted in thirty-
nine states 72 and Hawaii under such names as "Unfair Practices Act,"
"Unfair Sales Act," "Fair Sales Act" and others. In thirty of these
states 73 the acts are applicable to sales by wholesalers and retailers gen-
erally. Nine states not having acts of general application have acts
applying to specific commodities or trades such as milk, gasoline, the drug
trade and grocery store sales. 74 Sixteen of the states having acts of general
application have acts of specific application as well.75
72. Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, South Dakota and Vermont do not have any form of
sales-below-cost legislation. A complete compilation of sales-below-cost statutes may
be found in 2 CCH TRAD4 RZG. RXP. 1111 10000-5585 (1956). A full analysis of these
statutes appears in Comment, 32 IiL. L. Rzv. 816 (1938). See also Notes, 34 VA. L.
Rv. 201 (1948); 25 VA. L. Rxv. 699 (1939); Comment, 57 YALM L.J. 391 (1948).
Sales-below-cost statutes have been declared unconstitutional in whole or in part in the
following states: Colorado, Standard Store v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas.
68153 (Dist. Ct.) ; Georgia, Williams v. Hirsch, 211 Ga. 534, 87 S.E2d 70 (1955) ;
Maine, Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A2d 289 (1956) ; Maryland, Cohen v. Frey
& Sons, Inc., 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951) ; New Jersey, State v. Packard Bam-
berger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180, 8 A.2d 291 (1939). The Supreme Court has not passed
upon the constitutionality of such legislation. For a case holding such a statute con-
stitutional, see Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co.,
11 Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938).
73. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin and Wyoming. Also Hawaii.
74. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio
and Texas.
75. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee and Utah.
TRADING STAMPS
Generally, sales-below-cost statutes declare it unlawful, with certain
exceptions,"6 for a wholesaler or retailer to sell merchandise at prices
less than the lower of invoice cost or replacement value, minus normal trade
discounts 7 and the cost of doing business. The cost of doing business is
defined to include, among other things, "labor, rent, interest on borrowed
capital, depreciation, selling cost, maintenance of equipment, delivery costs,
credit losses, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising." 78
Certain of the statutes prescribe a minimum mark-up presumed to cover
the cost of doing business. 79 If the distributor sells below this mark-up,
the burden is on him to prove that his costs are lower.80  Most of the
statutes require the presence of an element of intent to injure competitors or
destroy competition before the sale below cost is unlawful,8 ' but many make
resulting injury to competitors or destruction of competition presumptive
evidence of the requisite intent.82 Some simply state that a sale below cost
shall be prima facie evidence of a violation.8s In addition to the above
provisions, some statutes provide that it is unlawful to "give, offer to
give or advertise the intent to give away any article" with the intent or
effect of destroying competition or injuring competitors.8 4 A few have
provisions similar to the "anti-concession" clauses found in fair trade
acts.s5
The use of trading stamps presents three principal issues with respect
to sales-below-cost legislation: 1) whether distribution of trading stamps
"give[s] away any article" within the meaning of the statute; 2) whether
trading stamps are a "concession"; 3) whether issuance of trading stamps
with goods sold at the statutory minimum results in a sale at "less than the
cost thereof to such vendor."
Trading Stamps as a Gift
The first of these issues arose in the case of Food and Grocery Bureau,
Inc. v. Garfield." The California Unfair Practices Act declared it un-
lawful to sell any article "at less than the cost thereof" or to "give away
any article or product" for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroy-
76. These exceptions commonly are: close-out sales, either for the purpose of
discontinuing trade in a certain item or to dispose of seasonable or perishable goods;
sales of damaged goods; sales by an officer acting under orders of any court; sales
made in good faith to meet the legal prices of competitors. E.g. ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 70-306 (1947) ; CONN. GnN. STAT. § 6717 (1949) (also including other exceptions).
77. Cash discounts are usually specifically excepted.
78. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 70-303 (1947); CAL. Bus. & PRor. CoDs ANN.
§ 17029 (West 1954).
79. E.g., ibid; CONN. GiN. STAT. § 6715 (1949).
80. E.g., ibid; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-403 (1948).
81. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-303 (1947); CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODn ANN.
§ 17043 (West 1954).
82. E.g., id. § 17071; MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 113 (1951).
83. E.g., CONN. G . STAT. § 6716 (1949); KAN. Gi. STAT. ANN. § 50-403
(1949).
84. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-303 (1947) ; Ky. R v. STAT. § 365.030 (1953).
85. E.g., Pennsylvania Unfair Cigarette Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 231.4
(Purdon 1953).
86. 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3 (1942).
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ing competition87 Plaintiff did not allege a sale below cost, but only that
the issuance of stamps amounted to the giving away of an article or product.
The court held that it did not, on the ground that a gift is the "transfer of
property without consideration" 88 and that distribution of stamps is not such
a transaction since the stamps are a discount for the payment of cash, i.e.,
are given in consideration for the payment of cash.
The court assumed that by the words "give away" the legislature meant
a gift as so defined. If this premise be accepted, then it was, of course,
proper for the court next to determine whether the stamps are actually
transferred to the customer for a consideration. And if from the seller's
standpoint the stamps are a true cash discount, the court's conclusion is
sound. Plaintiff disputed the "cash discount" appellation by asserting that
because the defendant's entire business was conducted on a cash basis,
because he gave stamps only to those who asked for them, because he had
"double stamp days" and because he advertised that his stamps were
"free," defendant's stamp plan was not a true cash discount.
Although the court rejected this argument, there nevertheless seems
much to support plaintiff's contention that the stamps are not a true cash
discount."" However, even accepting plaintiff's view that the stamps are
simply a promotional device to attract and hold trade, may not such trade
be deemed the agreed exchange, when coupled with the fact that the seller
transfers stamps only to those who buy and only because they do buy?
But if these facts negate a gift, there remains little that is made unlawful
by this provision. Perhaps the only transfers banned are those bearing no
relation to a sale, such as distribution of dishes to anyone who enters the
store. Yet consideration might be found here also, for if the purpose of
the transfer was to attract prospective buyers, and if in fact they come, the
merchant has obtained what he bargained for.9
The provision may be rescued from such potential nullification by
denying the court's assumption that by the words "give away" the legisla-
ture intended a transfer without consideration. A more popular use of
this phrase is to denote a transfer for which the transferee need not pay.
By this interpretation, the free-dish transaction would be banned. Trading
stamps, on the other hand, may not be banned, as there is good reason to
believe-contrary to the insistence of the stamp companies-that the house-
wife pays for her stamps, at least in part.91
Trading Stamps as "Concessions"
The "concession" issue was considered in Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
v. Margetts.9 2 A New Jersey statute prohibiting sales of gasoline below
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17043 (West 1954).
88. 20 Cal. 2d at 233, 125 P2d at 6.
89. See note 41 supra.
90. See FumLt,, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 311-12 (1947); cf. Soule v. Bon Ami Co.,
201 App. Div. 794, 195 N.Y. Supp. 574 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 609, 139 N.E. 754
(1922).
91. See Comment, 24 TENN. L. REv. 557, 563-66 (1956).
92. 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
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cost contained a provision that no "rebates, allowances, concessions or bene-
fits shall be given, directly or indirectly, so as to permit any person to
obtain motor fuel from a retail dealer below the posted price or at a net
price lower than the posted price applicable at the time of the sale." 1-
The court held trading stamps not covered, observing:
"The avowed purpose of this statutory regulation is the prevention,
in the public interest, of fraudulent and unfair practices in the retailing
of motor fuel. But there is no suggestion in the enactment itself of a
design to outlaw the true cash discount as a means to this end." 4
Two concurring justices felt that the stamps were within the terms of
the act but the applicable provision was an "arbitrary, discriminatory and
unreasonable interference with a private business, and therefore unconsti-
tutional." 95
The court properly turned to the act's purpose for amplification of
what the legislature meant by "rebates, allowances, concessions or benefits."
However, its finding that the act was to prevent "fraudulent and unfair
practices in the retailing of motor fuel" is not helpful because "unfair
practices" are ultimately such practices as the act made unlawful. For
the court, then, to assert, without recourse to the enumerated reprehensible
practices, that the act did not ban a "true cash discount" and that stamps
are a means of giving such a discount is simply the statement of a
conclusion.
Evidently, by adding the "concessions" clause the legislature intended to
indicate that for the purposes of this act a sale below the posted price might
be made in ways other than by simply setting a lower price. "[R]ebates,
allowances, concessions or benefits" suggest the dispensation to the buyer of
something of value besides the motor fuel purchased.9 6 Such an inter-
pretation need not include a windshield wipe, free air or an oil check, for
there is no indication in the history of this type of legislation that it is
intended to ban all types of competitive practices. Rather, it appears to be
aimed only at price competition under certain circumstances.97 It thus
seems not unwarranted, when considering benefits conferred on the buyer,
98
to limit the scope of the "concessions" clause to situations where the buyer
is given something of value which is directly related to price. As previously
discussed, a trading stamp bears such a relation.99
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-2 (1940). This portion of the statute related spe-
cifically to a price posting requirement rather than to the sales below cost provisions,
but it is believed that the principles involved are identical.
94. 15 N.J. at 208, 104 A.2d at 312.
95. 15 NJ. at 206, 104 A.2d at 311 (as approved in the concurring opinion).
96. The words may also suggest a forebearance on the part of the seller, but since
the issue is whether the giving of trading stamps by the seller is a violation, the second
meaning is not germane to the problem.
97. See pp. 259-60 infra.
98. See text following note 104 infra.
99. See text following note 5 supra.
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Trading Stamps and Sales Below Cost
At least two courts have found that issuance of trading stamps does
not result in a sale below cost within the meaning of these statutes. In
Trade Comm'n v. Bush 100 it was held that violation of the act did not
follow from distribution of stamps with a sale made at the statutory mark-up
because the intent required by the act was not shown. The court noted
that the effect of the stamp transaction was debatable and that only a very
small percentage of defendant's sales were made at the minimum price,
whereas stamps were given with all purchases. It then stated:
"[Defendant] insisted that his only intent was to increase his business,
not to harm anyone, frankly admitting that which we all know,-that
any sales increase he enjoyed of necessity reduced the sales of another
or others . . . Particularly is . . . [the requisite intent lack-
ing] in light of the declared purpose of the Act, to safeguard the public
against monopolies by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices
by which fair and honest competition is destroyed,-a purpose ap-
parently directed at the vicious price wars of a past era, preambling an
Act perhaps born of economic necessity or a changing philosophy or
both,-one of a rising tide of Unfair Practices Acts, many drawn in
haste, loosely worded and provocative of constitutional doubts inviting
irreconcilable decisions." 101
The problem of intent on which the court focused in the Bush case
would be obviated in many jurisdictions by statutory presumptions of
intent or by the absence of a requirement of intent as an element of the
offense. But when the problem cannot be avoided, it should be recognized
that the issue is defendant's intent to injure competitors in a way made
unlawful by the act, not his intent to violate the act. Once defendant ad-
mits that his aim was to attract business from his competitors, then all
that remains is to discover whether his conduct in fact violated the act.loia
Although employing language of intent, the Bush court reasoned that in
view of the act's purpose, as they ascertained it, the trading stamp transac-
tion was not a violation. This suggests that the best way to meet the intent
problem is to decide first the underlying issue-is the transaction a
violation.
In Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Safeway Stores, Inc.0 2 plaintiff
trade association sought to enjoin the defendant from cutting prices below
cost, whereupon defendant claimed in defense that members of the associa-
tion were themselves selling below cost by giving trading stamps, and that
100. 259 P.2d 304 (Utah 1953).
101. 259 P.2d at 306.
101a. Although it is not within the scope of this Note to discuss the constitutional
problems raised by sales-below-cost legislation, it should be noted that because these
statutes are penal, it is thus possible that some courts.might reject for constitutional
reasons the literal construction of the intent provisions suggested in the text. See
Director of Revenue v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221 P.2d 343 (1950).
102. 1955 Trade Cas. 1168195 (Okla. Dist. Ct.).
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it was necessary for defendant to meet this competition. Defendant asked
that plaintiffs be enjoined from the practice. The court held that issuance
of trading stamps was not a violation, but was a discount for the payment
of cash.
In resolving the status of the stamp transaction under the statute,
assertions that the stamps are a discount for the payment of cash, a pro-
motional device or de mininis are not helpful, for the same reasons given
in discussing the relation of the stamps to fair trade laws.103 So also, on
the other hand, are the contentions that the stamps violate the act because
they may be redeemed for valuable merchandise and therefore appear to
reduce the price from the buyer's standpoint, or that the stamps are a
form of retroactive quantity discount. Thus, as in the case of fair trade, the
stamp transaction must be considered against the purpose of the legislation.
The Purpose of Sales-Below-Cost Acts
Sales-below-cost legislation developed contemporaneously with the
fair trade laws.104 Depression born, it represented an attempt to relieve the
pressure on the small retailer or wholesaler who was being squeezed out
in the quest for the declining number of consumer dollars.'0 5 California led
the way, as it did in fair trade legislation, with the passage in 1935 of an
Unfair Practices Act containing a sales-below-cost provision. 06 The his-
torical antecedent of such a provision may be found in earlier antitrust
laws prohibiting sharp price cutting as a monopoly tactic.'0 7 Minimum
price provisions were also found in many of the NRA codes and in the
earlier voluntary codes adopted by trade associations as a result of trade
practices conferences conducted under the auspices of the Federal Trade
Commission.' 08
These developments may be summarized as recognizing the desirability
of free competition but also the dangers in too much of it. Accordingly,
legislatures sought a means of eliminating the more destructive competitive
practices. One evil toward which sales-below-cost statutes were directed
was excessive price cutting, specifically loss-leader selling.'0 9 Other prac-
tices which were to be curtailed were bait advertising "0 and giving away of
merchandise."'1
103. See pp. 248-49 mupra.
104. GvrHR, op. cit. supra note 48, at 26, 32-33.
105. Ibid.
106. The 1935 California Unfair Practices Act is reproduced in GRTH3, op. ci.
supra note 48, at 413-22.
107. Id. at 36.
108. Id. at 37-38.
109. Id. at 36. For a full discussion of leaders and loss leaders, see id. at 199-224.
110. Bait advertising may be defined as the advertising at low prices of merchan-
dise which the advertiser either is not prepared to sell at all or, at most, only in very
limited quantities. Its purpose is to attract patronage. Nearly all sales-below-cost
statutes attempt to ban this practice by making it unlawful not only to sell below cost
but also to advertise or offer merchandise for sale below cost. E.g., CoLo. Rxv. STAT.
ANm. § 55-2-3 (1953); KAN. GsN. STAT. Aim. § 50-402 (1949).
111. See provisions cited in note 84 mipra.
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Because the purpose of sales-below-cost legislation is to rescue the
retailer and wholesaler from the excesses of price competition, it becomes
necessary to determine whether the stamp transaction is a form of price
competition. The fact that a stamp is an item of value and that the
number given is in direct proportion to the sale price tends to indicate
that it is, with the result that distribution of stamps with sales at cost is a
violation of the act. 1 2
CONCLUSION
Running through the cases dealing with the relation of trading stamps
to the fair trade and sales-below-cost laws are a number of arguments
which upon closer examination prove to be simply conclusions. The
most persistent of these is the "cash discount" theory, which has been
accepted as decisive in numerous cases without a critical evaluation of its
utility in resolving the particular question involved. With regard to the
two principal issues, the lawfulness of stamp issuance with sales made
at the fair trade price or at cost under the respective acts, a sound conclusion
can be reached only by examining the stamp transaction in terms of the
respective legislative purposes. Since the two types of legislation have
different purposes, the fair trade acts to protect the manufacturer's good
will in branded products and the sales-below-cost acts to curtail destructive
price competition, different conclusions may, and it appears should, be
reached.1 3
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112. It should be noted that the transaction is also a violation if stamps worth two
cents to the consumer are given with a purchase of goods at one cent above cost.
113. Other types of price fixing or regulating statutes exist besides the two broad
types discussed. One of the more popular of these is the milk control law. Such a
statute generally establishes an elaborate procedure for the fixing of milk prices and
makes it unlawful to sell at other than these prices. E.g., PA. SmAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j
(Purdon Supp. 1955). Here again a question may arise if stamps are given with milk
purchases. Some milk control laws preclude this problem by expressly forbidding the
use of stamps. E.g., id. § 700j-807. But where this is not the case, an appeal to the
purpose of the act would again appear proper. It would seem that milk control laws
may well have a different purpose than that of either sales-below-cost or fair trade
statutes.
